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ANTITRUST OVERREACH IN LABOR
MARKETS:
A RESPONSE TO ERIC POSNER
Richard A. Epstein*
In this article, I offer a response to the criticisms that Eric Posner
has directed at my initial article, which questions the importance that
the Biden administration and many law and economics scholars
attach to the perceived undue market power that employers enjoy in
labor markets. This paper explains why the definition of relevant
labor markets for both high-skilled and low-skill workers is, in most
cases (certain hospital settings excepted), far broader than the
relevant product markets. Thus, the concentration ratios in product
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Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, and the James Parker
Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law emeritus and senior lecturer, the
University of Chicago. I thank Mitchell K. Pallaki, NYU School of Law, class of 2022,
and Jeremy Brown, University of Chicago Law School, class of 2021, for helpful
comments.
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markets, which are relevant to antitrust merger policy, have little or
no relevance for labor markets, especially today when labor turnover
is high: firms are experiencing persistent shortages that are
inconsistent with the standard effort of monopsonists to depress
wages to create pools of excess labor. I also critique the empirical
literature that purports to find widespread evidence of monopsony
power and also argue that the current regime dealing with worker
covenants not-to-compete is adequate for dealing with the supposed
efforts of employers to restrict labor mobility. Accordingly, it is
important to guard against both excessive regulation and litigation
in an area that functions well under the current legal regime.
INTRODUCTION
I am very grateful to my Chicago colleague Eric Posner for his
thoughtful reply1 to my recent paper, The Application of Antitrust Law
to Labor Markets —Then and Now.2 In the article, I offered an insistent
critique of modern antitrust enthusiasts who seek to radically expand
the role of antitrust law generally, and to apply that renewed vigor
to labor markets, where, to date, it is agreed by all commentators that
it has received relatively little attention.
The skirmish between Posner and myself over antitrust in labor
markets is, as he rightly points out, part of a larger struggle over the
traditional Chicago version of antitrust law associated most
prominently with Robert Bork and Eric’s father, Richard A. Posner.
As young Posner notes, with evident skepticism, the Chicago school
takes its cue from classical liberal thought whose central tenets are
two-fold. First, there is a strong presumption in favor of individual
liberty against government intervention. The control of force and

1 Eric A. Posner, Antitrust and Labor Markets: A Reply to Richard Epstein, 15 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 389 (2022) [hereinafter Posner, Reply].
2 Richard A. Epstein, The Application of Antitrust Law to Labor Markets—Then and
Now, 15 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 327 (2022) [hereinafter Epstein, Labor Antitrust].
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fraud is the most common objective for any legal system, as
cooperative behavior in family, firms, and various social groups
could hardly go on if these twin vices were permitted to operate
unabated. Hence, a serious legal investment in the control of these
devices makes good sense, so long as we remain wary of the risk of
government overreach, which distorts markets—as often happens in
securities cases—by branding beneficial or neutral conduct as
fraudulent.3
Second, as Posner notes, there is a strong consensus that certain
forms of monopoly behavior are also subject to government
oversight because of their real potential to reduce overall social
welfare by cartelization that either fixes prices or divides territories.
Mergers are, as a key corollary of this fundamental proposition, a
more difficult case to deal with because they have both efficiency
benefits and restrictive potential. Most mergers are little concern
because their small market-shares do not have or create sufficient
market power to disrupt social relations. Instead, mergers tend to be
self-regulating. The good ones will survive if the economic synergies
work, but they will either fail or unravel if it does not. But, it is widely
agreed that mergers between titans within a given market could
produce monopoly losses that exceed any efficiency gains, so that it
is a legitimate government function to conduct a pre-merger review,
discharged today largely through the Hart-Scott-Rodino statute,4 to
check to see that these transactions do not create undue social
concentration, often measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index
(HHI).5
The agreement of this broad framework conceals, however, some
serious differences. Posner thinks that I am decidedly old-school
when I state that

3 See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). I critiqued the case
in Richard A. Epstein, Returning to Common-Law Principles of Insider Trading After
United States v. Newman, 125 YALE L.J. 1482 (2016).
4 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
5 See Epstein, Labor Antitrust, supra note 2, at 333.
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the real threat to competition comes not from businesses but
from workers who organize unions, and politicians who
meddle with labor markets. Epstein believes that unions
push wages above the competitive level, disrupt commerce,
squelch growth, and discourage innovation like charter
schools.6
I confess that I am baffled that anyone could think otherwise.7
Why do workers organize unions if they do not hope to obtain some
monopoly profits? They can obtain efficiencies by cooperating with
employers through a variety of contractual devices, including the
company union and the suggestion box. But, the former is banned
under Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act,8 and the
latter is strongly discouraged by the rule that once unions are put in
place, there are no direct relationships between the employer and any
employee, as all interactions are to be coordinated by the union. The
decline of unions in the private sector is now well known,9 and one
reason for that change is that free trade in the market for goods and
services reduces the level of firm economic rents that are subject to
union appropriation. And, the reason why public unions are both
more powerful and more durable is that prison guards, police, and
firefighters are not threatened by the free entry that has reduced the
available rents to the old AT&T and to the Big Three automobile
makers—General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler—before the entry of
foreign car makers.
Yet, when unions are given the chance, they do more than raise
wages. They squelch growth by making it difficult for firms to adapt
to new circumstances by changing work rules, outsourcing, or

Posner, Reply, supra note 1, at 390-91 (citations omitted).
For a longer, recent statement of my views, with replies, see Richard A. Epstein,
American Workers Do Not Need Unions, LAW & LIBERTY (July 1, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/W7LM-TLNM.].
8 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2).
9 See Posner, Reply, supra note 1, at 394-97.
6
7
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altering wage structures.10 They disrupt commerce by shutting down
or slowing down public transportation, education, and athletics,
where the inability to stockpile daily services leads to immense
“incidental” damage. The visible antipathy of public teacher unions
to charter schools is too conspicuous to be ignored. Posner starts,
then, from a set of indefensible priors about labor markets, which
should cause readers to be suspicious when he claims that employers
obtain large unidentified sources of monopsony rents through labor
markets. It is important to answer this in three ways. First, I shall
explain why the current raft of shortages in multiple labor markets is
inconsistent with any claim that employers possess sufficient market
power to create a pool of idle workers. Second, I shall then look at
the explicit restrictions on trade in connection with covenants not-tocompete in order to show that these do not create pools of monopoly
power. Third, I shall examine the claim that a wealth of econometric
evidence demonstrates that in a large number of industries,
monopsony power is able to reduce overall worker welfare—hence,
his expansive title How Antitrust Failed Workers, with no explicit
limitations.11
I. THE BASIC THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The central proposition of the modern view on labor antitrust
law is that substantial pockets of monopsony power allow employers
to suppress wages below competitive levels. If that premise is correct,
baleful consequences follow. The total amount of labor hired will be
reduced. Employers will, therefore, cut back on total output so that
the social losses are found in both labor and product (including
service) markets. Put otherwise, labor monopsony power should be
treated with the same hostility as monopoly power.
The central challenge here is to identify the places where such
power exists. That cannot be done by tracing movements in the

10
11

See, e.g., Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
ERIC A. POSNER, HOW ANTITRUST FAILED WORKERS (2021).
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quantities of goods and services sold or the prices charged for them.
If demand increases, prices (and wages) and quantities will increase
in both competitive and monopoly (or monopsony) markets. If costs
increase, then prices (and wages) will go up, but the quantities of
goods and services will go down, again in both competitive and
monopoly (or monopsony) markets. Hence, it is critical to find some
marker that applies to the monopsony but not the competitive
market. Posner and his supporters posit that the difference lies in the
excess capacity that exists only in monopsony markets, where
employers bid down wages so that some workers who would be
hired in competitive markets are forced to the sidelines.
At present, that looks to be a colossally incorrect description of
the situation in current labor markets. The most common trope used
today to describe the conditions of these markets is the “Great
Resignation,” coined by organizational psychologist Anthony
Klotz. 12 The term refers to the situation where record numbers of
individuals are quitting their jobs, often at large and powerful firms,
so that we witness the odd situation in which the number of want
ads for new employees has reached massive proportions, despite
some persistent unemployment. The labor shortages for all sorts of
professions, both skilled and unskilled, have reached major
proportions across the board. Employers have responded with
extensive recruitment strategies, signing bonus, and wage increases.
They have shaped the way in which work takes place, so that time in
the office is down and working from home becomes more accessible.
It does not matter whether one looks for bus drivers, nurses, truck
drivers, or lower-level employees. For example, Goldman Sachs has
decided to cut back on its firing because it “faces an industrywide

12 Juliana Kaplan, The Psychologist Who Coined the Phrase 'Great Resignation' Reveals
How He Saw It Coming and Where He Sees It Going. 'Who We Are as an Employee and as a
Worker Is Very Central to Who We Are.’, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 2, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/5GHH-83P4].
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talent shortage.” 13 The nursing profession also faces a shortage in
markets where, tellingly, traveling nurses earn a substantial
premium over workers at a single location. 14 And, in the highly
decentralized trucking industry, the search for drivers is described
as hypercompetitive.15 And, labor shortages are acute for hospitality
and restaurant workers with, by one count, 1.7 million job openings
compared to 1.0 million quits, a ratio that is well out of whack with
historical norms.16
There are of course multiple nuances in each and every industry,
but no one—anyone—speaks of that mysterious excess capacity that
the Posner and his confederates posit as the long-term institutional
norm. Instead, the entire movement is driven by personal and
lifestyle changes after COVID, so that personal identity looms larger
relative to traditional economic concerns, at least in the short-run.
The situation is further muddied by rising inflation, which for the
moment is outpacing wage increases.17 It is just not possible in the
face of this massive reorganization of the labor market to give any

13 Lydia Moynihan, Goldman Sachs to Ease Its Yearly Firings as Wall Street Faces Talent
Shortage, N.Y. POST (Dec. 9, 2021) [https://perma.cc/VRP2-NTZG].
14 Jenni Fink, Hospitals Have Lost Fewer Employees in 2021 than 2020, Despite Nursing
Shortage Crisis, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 13, 2021) [https://perma.cc/6CTN-8YTG] (noting the
loss of 29,000 workers this year and also observing that “[t]ravel nurses, who move
around the country on different assignments, can make significantly more money than
those who work at a single hospital”).
15 David J. Lynch, Amid Huge Shortage, New Truck Drivers Train for Some of Supply
Chain’s Toughest Jobs, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8SFR-5KLS]. The
author notes both that the regulatory environment renders many drivers ineligible
because they cannot meet standards set out in the drug/alcohol list, which compounds
the high turnover rate in the industry. Note that for drivers, the potential market is
probably more national or regional than local, reducing any probable effect of
monopsony power.
16 Rani Molla, Service Workers Are Getting Paid More Than Ever. It’s Not Enough, VOX
(Nov. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/U57A-HW4G].
17 Ryan McMaken, Inflation Surges Near to a 40-Year High. Wages Aren't Keeping Up.,
MISES WIRE (Dec. 11, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8JYD-TJML] (explaining that average
hourly earnings are up 4.8 percent in contrast to inflation, which is up to 6.9 percent).
Like everything else on this topic, the differential could be attributed, in part, to the
shift from office to home work, which results in lower commuting costs in both time
and money.
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macroeconomic credit to the claim that pockets of excess labor are
part of some grand scheme. Indeed, none of the many stories on this
issue even mention the supposed monopsony problem, and instead
point to the heroic efforts of firms to hire more workers in sector after
sector.
The question remains, moreover, just where do these workers go
once they quit? 18 Here, most of the answer is that they reposition
themselves in the labor force, rather than just dropping out. Thus,
one recent story in the Wall Street Journal notes: “Burned out
teachers are leaving the classroom for jobs in the private sector,
where talent-hungry companies are hiring them—and often boosting
their pay—to work in sales, software, healthcare and training, among
other fields.”19 And why? Because they have “ability to absorb and
transmit information quickly, manage stress and multitask.”20 And
so, they work in areas unrelated to their former jobs. In other cases,
the job shift is driven by COVID concerns, which in turn leads to
higher demands for working from home, if only three days a week.
It is also a time when applications to form new small business has
skyrocketed, attaining record high levels this past year: reaching
some 1.4 million through September 2021 over 1.14 million in 2020
and just under 1 million in 2019.21 These are small firms, and all of
them hire employees. It is not conceivable that all of these firms could
be part of some grand cartel scheme. Furthermore, it is common to
hear stories of people who quit their full-time job, and then negotiate
some alternative deal with their former employer that gives them the

18 On this topic, see generally Derek Thompson, Three Myths of the Great Resignation,
THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 8, 2021) [https://perma.cc/V6RE-Q4W2].
19 Kathryn Dill, Teachers Are Quitting, and Companies Are Hot to Hire Them: Businesses
Eager to Fill Jobs Are Offering Former Educators Better Pay and More Autonomy, WALL
STREET J. (Jan. 31, 2022) [https://perma.cc/Y2GT-3SDE]..
20 Id.
21 Thompson, supra note 18.
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freedom of taking additional gigs elsewhere. 22 But, moreover, it
should be painfully apparent that exit options for current workers
are far greater than the monopsony model either anticipates or
predicts. Indeed, I have not been able to locate a single source that
has focused on the short-term markets that even mentions this
problem, largely because no matter what some of the econometric
studies suggest, monopsony can be, at most, a localized phenomenon
that does not impact the vast bulk of American workers who work in
wide range of different occupations and firms, many of which are
small.
II. EXPRESS RESTRAINTS
I turn, next, to one possible exception where some monopsony
may be exerted; namely, those areas in which there are explicit
covenants not-to-compete that strap low-income workers. Posner
summarizes the case as follows:
Statistics showing that a vast number of low-skill workers
are subject to noncompetes, which are almost certainly not
enforceable, along with evidence that the wages of those
workers are suppressed in states with high levels of
noncompete enforcement, indicating that the noncompetes
operate through an in terrorem effect. Only highly
compensated employees can afford lawyers to contest
noncompetes in court, and so everyone else doesn’t.23
The objections to this position start with the observation that
most of these covenants not-to-compete are applicable only to efforts
to switch jobs to another franchisee of the same franchisor. There are
sensible efficiency reasons why firms might want to enforce these
covenants to prevent internal rivalries that all would recognize as

22 Daniel Newman, The Startup Surge: Business Formation in 2021 on Pace to Break
Record, ECON. INNOVATION GROUP (Oct. 15, 2021) [https://perma.cc/87VP-WP2C].
23 Posner, Reply, supra note 1, at 400.
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unacceptable if the franchisor operated the franchisees directly.24 The
prohibitions do not deal with movements to other potential
employers, whether an outright owner or the franchisor of another
chain. It is, therefore, far from clear whether these restrictions are
unenforceable against the employee. Nonetheless, the franchisor can
take direct action against the other franchisee so as to reduce this
particular risk. Moreover, there is surely no reason to suggest that a
firm will necessarily impose these restrictions at all. For example,
during his 2020 campaign, candidate Biden charged that McDonald’s
had extensively used these covenants, but the record has revealed
that the franchisor not only has never imposed covenants against
moving to rival chains, but had also in fact ended any restrictions
against movement from one of its franchisees to another in 2017.25
But even if the covenants are imposed, the so-called evidence of
suppressed wages might in the alternative just reflect the greater job
security associated with these positions.
It is also highly unlikely that these agreements operate through
an in terrorem effect on the individual. Posner misses the central point
when he assumes that low-level employees are on their own when it
comes to dealing with the enforcement of these covenants. There are
two clear responses to that position. First, the prospective employer
has a strong interest in determining whether or not the covenants are
enforceable against him. If they are, then the key remedy is not
against individual employees, but against the employer who
poaches—usually more than one worker—for inducement of breach
of contract. And, if that prospective employer knows that the
covenants are illegal, he can inform the worker and offer to foot the
costs of defense to the suit, which is likely to be directed more against
him than the worker. The inability of the worker to hire a lawyer is
thus of little consequence when a protector stands by. Second, the

See Epstein, Labor Antitrust, supra note 2, at 375-78.
Rem Rieder, Biden’s False Claim About McDonald’s, FACTCHECK.ORG (July 24, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/3KSA-QPHR].
24
25
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state attorneys general can engage in enforcement actions as well. For
example, even Posner and Ioana Marinescu noted that when the
Jimmy John’s restaurant chain imposed two-year noncompete terms
on employees switching to similar deli-style businesses within a
three-mile radius of its outlets, it was forced to back down after thenAttorney General Lisa Madigan brought a direct enforcement action
against it, which suggests that existing doctrine is sufficient to handle
the occasional outlier cases, without further change.26
The situation here is reminiscent of that which arose over 100
years ago in connection with the so-called yellow-dog contract,
whereby miners agreed with their employer that they would not join
another union, or even agree to join another union, so long as they
remained with their current employer. The union induced some of
these workers to break their contracts and were promptly sued for
inducement of breach of contract, because the action against the
union was far more valuable than the hapless task of suing each
individual worker for breach of contract. The actions were allowed
in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell,27 because all the requisites of
the tort were satisfied and no public policy objections could be raised
(at least at the time) for actions that were designed, correctly it turns
out, to prevent strike actions from leading to disruption in the
mines. 28 In these cases, the inducement of breach will fail if the
covenants not-to-compete were illegal, but they will succeed if they
were enforceable. The prospective employer should be able to deal
with those issues, and the prospect that it will step in as either a joint
tenant or as a protector of these workers should offer sufficient
deterrence against abuse.

26 Ioana Marinescu & Eric A. Posner, Why Has Antitrust Law Failed Workers?, 105
CORNELL L. REV. 1343, 1344 (2020). The official press report from the Office of the
Illinois Attorney General can be found at Madigan Announces Settlement with Jimmy
John’s for Imposing Unlawful Non-Compete Agreements, ILL. ATT’Y GEN. (Dec. 7, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/X36B-C2U4].
27 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
28 Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations? A Critique of the New Deal
Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1373-75 (1983).
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There could be some dislocations at the margins, but not as a
first-order problem. Indeed, the situation in the market gives no sign
of distress at all. Many of the workers who quit, stay quit, and thus
are not caught by the restrictions. And, those who take jobs
elsewhere do not seem to have provoked a rash of lawsuits, which
would be necessary for Posner’s story to work. The key feature here
is that, as noted earlier, there is a major shortage of workers in this
industry, like everywhere else, which suggests that the image of the
mad scramble for labor works well here, in what looks to be an
intensely competitive market.
III. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
We come at last to Posner’s response dealing with cases in which
the allegation of labor monopoly must rest on circumstantial
evidence, because, as Posner admits, direct evidence of cooperative
behavior to support the claim of monopsony power is exceedingly
difficult to come by,29 except, as noted, in connection with covenants
not-to-compete. In dealing with this issue, Posner places a great
weight on the exhaustive studies that purport to show these once
undetected reservoirs of monopoly power.30 But, what is lacking here
is any explanation as to how this practice of monopolization
operates, which is necessary to provide the context for
understanding the usefulness of this empirical evidence to Posner’s
argument. Posner and I both agree that the same conceptual
framework should apply to antitrust law in both product and labor
markets, but he is at a loss to explain why the enforcement
mechanisms have produced such paltry results for labor markets if
the problem is as large as the studies on which he relies claim. None

29 Posner, Reply, supra note 1, at 398 (“The frequency with which collusion takes
place in labor markets is an open question. Conspirators do not announce their
conspiracies; conspiracies must be uncovered through painstaking investigation.”).
30 See id. at 392 n.12 (citing several studies claiming to demonstrate monopoly
power in labor markets).
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of these studies, as far as I can determine, actually uncover any
explicit or implicit agreement among these firms so that the sole
evidence of such monopolization is thought to be conceptual.
An enormous amount of labor market differentiation is needed
before any HHI number is coherent. Yet when it comes to particulars,
Posner does not wade into these difficulties, but instead points to a
case on which there is no reason to dispute: “a recent hospital merger
in Abilene, Texas, involving a hospital with 70.1% of the market of
registered nurses and a hospital with 22.4% of the market of
registered nurses.”31 But, note that this merger probably also runs
aground under traditional antitrust law as applied to the medical and
health care services as offered to the public at-large—one has to
wonder exactly what is gained by blocking mergers on labor grounds
when they are already barred on product grounds. Indeed, Posner
does not and, with some evident glee, proclaims instead that since
both the Trump and Biden administrations pushed after labor
market activities, I should join the party. 32 But again, the firms
targeted by both administrations are conspicuous outliers, not—the
many—routine mergers. Thus, the recent Department of Justice
action against the effort of Penguin Random House—created by
prior merger—to acquire Simon & Shuster on the ground that it
could translate into lower author payments is yet another case of that
sort.33 There is only a single class of writers, easily identifiable, and
the effort to block this merger could take place as well on the ground
that the merger will not only drive down author payments, but drive
up the price of books.34

Id. at 393-94.
Id. at 405-06.
33 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Justice Department Sues to Block Penguin Random House’s
Acquisition of Rival Publisher Simon & Schuster (Nov. 2, 2021) [https://perma.cc/6Z5VXUHL].
34 For an account of this lawsuit, see Christie D’Zurilla, Authors Guild Doubles Down
on Support of Antitrust Suit Against Publisher Mega-Merger, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/2HWW-44ET].
31
32
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Posner states, incorrectly, that I do not deal with any of the
empirical evidence. 35 Yet I do discuss empirical evidence in some
detail, 36 including an important recent study by Elena Prager and
Matt Schmitt, which reaches far more nuanced conclusions. 37 The
cardinal virtue of that study is that it disaggregates workers by type
to see the extent to which they are subject to monopsony power
and/or have monopoly power of their own. The results of that study
comport with sensible theory. It finds substantial power in hospital
cases but only in cases where mergers lead to very high
concentrations: those which involve the top twenty-five percent of
HHI increases. And, even here, the situation can be complicated by
other institutional features. Thus, with regard to nurses, that
monopsony power is offset in part by the strength of the nurses’
union. The situation here is one of a classical bilateral monopoly,
where it is notoriously difficult to predict the distribution (or
dissipation) of any economic surplus between the parties—or to
draw any strong conclusions about the desirability of different splits.
But, at the opposite end of the spectrum, labor markets for custodial
and data entry services, for example, do not exhibit any form of
monopoly power. Custodians can swab floors in banks and hospitals,
large and small. Hospital entry clerks can work in banks or
supermarkets, wherever accounts have to be managed. There are, of
course, many gradations of professions in between where labor
mobility is in issue, perhaps because of some licensing requirement
or unique industry-specific skills. But, there is no theoretical reason
to be confident that a lumbering firm can do better in negotiations
than an individual worker who has a better sense of his or her needs
and options. What is clear is that the relevant market is not defined

Posner, Reply, supra note 1, at 394-95.
Epstein, Labor Antitrust, supra note 2, at 353-69, 385-86.
37 Elena Prager & Matt Schmitt, Employer Consolidation and Wages: Evidence from
Hospitals, 111 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (2021).
35
36
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by the business of the firm, but by the (quite different) markets for the
highly variegated services.
That point becomes critical when we look at some of the other
empirical studies that examine the extent of employer dominance in
labor markets.38 Thus, the most recent version of the working paper
by David Arnold39 goes beyond the hospital industry in an attempt
to assess the effect of mergers on wages in other labor markets. The
heterogeneity of industries in such a study necessarily weakens the
result and, to his credit, Arnold fully recognizes that the definition of
a product market never works as an accurate definition of a labor
market. Accordingly, he makes heroic efforts to measure industry
substitutability for the employees of a given firm. But, the success of
these corrections is necessarily limited—it is high unlikely that any
two workers in an industry will have identical options outside the
narrow product market area, depending on their previous work
experience, outside interests, relevant academic credentials, or other
skills. Arnold’s basic bottom line is that in some cases there is a
correlation between mergers and decreased wages. But, as with the
Prager and Schmitt study, the effect is usually weak so that the
antitrust scrutiny in labor markets makes sense “only for very large
mergers that generate considerable shifts in local concentration,
similar to how antitrust is enforced for product markets,” 40 which
tracks my position.
The studies that seek to extend the antitrust law outside this
narrow compass are far less persuasive. Thus, Kevin Rinz attempts
to estimate the effect of labor market concentration on worker

38 My deep thanks to Jeremy Brown for guiding me through this econometric
thicket.
39 David Arnold, Mergers and Acquisitions, Local Labor Market Concentration,
and Worker Outcomes (April 2, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Arnold,
April 2021 Mergers & Acquisitions] [https://perma.cc/6ELG-BJQU]. An earlier (Jan.
21, 2020) version, which is cited in Posner’s response, Posner, Reply, supra note 1, at
393 n. 18, is archived at https://perma.cc/Z4HW-LMUC.
40 Arnold, April 2021 Mergers & Acquisitions, supra note 39, at 3.
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earnings more generally.41 Yet, his study founders on its inability to
know which industries are in competition with each other in labor
markets as well as for which portions of their workforce. More
specifically, he relies on the North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS), under which all workers are said to fall within the
“labor market” for that industry. The study also limits itself to
workers within the same commuting zone.
Both of these constraints have a built-in bias to overstate the level
of industry concentration. On the former, it is palpably odd to
assume that all workers for a large firm work within in the same labor
sector, when any given firm of any size will hire workers in dozens,
if not hundreds of different job categories, some with high mobility
and others less so. Nor does the restriction on commuting zone
provide valuable insight into market concentrations. Many people
who change jobs also decide consciously to move far distances. The
recent Census Bureau state population and migration estimates from
between July 1, 2020 and July 1, 202142 bear witness to extensive labor
switches across distinctive geographical markets for which a
“commuting zone” statistic seems wholly irrelevant. Thus, the three
big losers from negative migration were New York (net loss of
319,020 people), California (net loss of 261,902 people), and Illinois
(net loss of 113,776 people), all of which are progressive states, and
three big winners were Texas (net gain of 310,288 people), Florida
(net gain of 211,196 people) and Arizona (net gain of 98,330 people),

41 Kevin Rinz, Labor Market Concentration, Earnings, and Inequality, J. HUM. RES. (Oct.
12, 2020) (forthcoming) [https://perma.cc/G9U4-VCY2] (Posner, Reply, supra note 1,
at 391 n. 12). See also Efraim Benmelech, Nittai K. Bergman, & Hyunseob Kim, Strong
Employers and Weak Employees: How Does Employer Concentration Affect Wages?, J. HUM.
RES. (Dec. 14, 2020) (forthcoming) [https://perma.cc/UY5J-E55Y] (Posner, Reply, supra
note 1, at 392 n. 15), which incorporates many of the weaknesses of the Rinz study,
while focusing on manufacturing industries, which rules out some industries like
trucking, which are geographically dispersed.
42 New Vintage 2021 Population Estimates Available for the Nation, States and Puerto
Rico, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/F4FR-QWMV].
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which are far more conservative. Close to a million people entered
the top-ten growth states and approximately 750,000 people left the
ten largest losers. Many of these people were surely going to take
new jobs, so that any computation based on a localized “commuting
zone” understates the level of mobility. Moreover, many jobs are in
no sense local. The trucking industry employs about 3.6 million
drivers,43 for whom the notion of a commuting zone is fanciful, at
best.
Notwithstanding these theoretical difficulties, Rinz relies chiefly
on a regression relating average earnings per year in a market (where
he defines a market as the intersection of an industry and a
commuting zone) to concentration in the market (as measured by
HHI). He finds a negative relationship between concentration and
earnings, with the most dramatic conclusion that a worker moving
from the median level of concentration to the 75th percentile would
lead to a reduction in mean earnings of about 15 percent.44 On their
face, the results seem incredible, because it is doubtful that in any
real-world settings even a strong labor cartel could achieve that
result. In addition, the study just has to be wrong because it defines
labor markets in terms of product markets, while ignoring the
enormous movement across industries found by first Prager and
Schmitt, and then acknowledged by Arnold. Why then trust a study
whose author notes that 75% of those in his dataset who change jobs
go to a different NAICS industry?45 As Arnold noted, studies, like
Rinz’s, have measurement problems due to “potentially arbitrary
market definitions.”46 The study also uses an extraordinarily crude
measure of earnings—average wage for all workers in a market for
(it appears) an entire year47—that will necessarily miss heterogeneity

43 Truck Drivers in the US: Employment and Haul Statistics, ALLTRUCKING.COM (last
visited Dec. 29, 2021) [https://perma.cc/KV82-PXAC].
44 Rinz, supra note 41, at 21.
45 Id. at 7 n.9.
46 Arnold, April 2021 Mergers & Acquisitions, supra note 39, at 10.
47 See Rinz, supra note 41, at 9, 16 (discussing the study’s reliance on annual W-2
data to calculate average wages).
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across workers and will not capture any difference in nonwage
compensation, including health and retirement benefits, as well as
differences in working conditions. Finally, using HHI rather than
merger activity as a concentration measure risks misattributing
lower wages to industry structure when such correlations may really
be due to other factors that impact both wages and concentration.48
Finally, Azar et al. attempts to improve on previous studies by
defining labor markets by occupational classifications rather than
industries (product markets). 49 Posner notes that this study
“estimate[s] that 60% of labor markets are characterized by HHIs
higher than 2,500, and a quarter of labor markets have HHIs higher
than an eye-watering 7,200.” 50 But, it is a mistake to assume this
study reaches defensible conclusions on the larger question of
monopsony power in labor markets outside a few limited
circumstances.
The Azar study considers 26 occupational categories that, like the
studies of Prager and Schmitt, cover the gamut from skilled
professions like “Registered nurses” and “Industrial engineers” to
unskilled professions like “Telemarketers” and “Driver/sales
workers.” Their results, however, are reported in aggregate form
when what is needed is an occupation by occupation break down,
given that mobility often varies by occupation. Where Rinz used
industries, Azar instead constructs a labor market model using the
intersection of occupational classifications and a commuting zone,

48 Arnold, April 2021 Mergers & Acquisitions, supra note 39, at 10 (“If increased
import competition causes low productivity firms to exit the market, then the fall in
labor demand will cause wages to fall. Therefore, wages will be negatively correlated
with increases in concentration, but in this case the correlation has nothing to do with
monopsony power.” (citations omitted)).
49 José Azar, Ioana Marinescu & Marshall Steinbaum, Labor Market Concentration, J.
HUM. RES. (May 12, 2020) (forthcoming) [https://perma.cc/QVR2-XVB9] (Posner,
Reply, supra note 1, at 392 n. 12).
50 Posner, Reply, supra note 1, at 393 (explaining Azar, Marinescu & Steinbaum,
supra note 49).
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measured by looking at job postings from 2010 to 2013 from
Careerbuilder.com. Wages for each of these “labor markets” were
calculated by averaging the advertised wages, which may well be
lower than negotiated wages for each quarter. They treat “posted
vacancies as a proxy for local demand,”51 though there is nothing
that states that the relationship between these two figures is fixed.
Further, there is no reason to think that these classifications are even
an accurate proxy for market concentration. Labor market
concentration was again measured using the HHI, where a firm’s
“market share” is approximated by the number of job postings in a
quarter divided by the total number of job postings. In some cases,
these could be high, but in many cases (as in their Figure 3, which
shows a large number of HHIs at 10,000), the only interpretation can
be that, in that quarter only, a single firm is active, which tells next to
nothing about basic market concentration.52 The authors do exclude
these firms from their alternative calculations in order to check the
robustness of their analysis, but their very existence shows the perils
of seeking to use postings as a proxy for labor market concentration,
without offering any strong evidence of how wages vary with
changes in the HHI.
Indeed, as a general matter, it is likely that highly narrow
markets will exhibit high HHI because of the small number entries.
As an illustrative example, a quarter in which one firm advertises
three nursing jobs and a second firm advertises one nursing job
would yield an HHI of 6,250 (752 + 252). It is important to be sensitive
to how labor postings (which are a small fraction of total
employment) can be a rather volatile measure of labor demand
because they are driven by the small numbers of postings in any
given case, so that a shift of one worker, or the addition of another,
could radically alter the HHI ratio. The authors provide no
explanation as to how they relate job openings to overall
employment levels at given firms during the relevant time frame.

51
52

Azar, Marinescu & Steinbaum, supra note 49, at 18.
Id. at 38.
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Nor is there any explanation for the exclusion from their calculations
businesses that are not hiring within a given period, no matter how
large or small their workforce. And most importantly, the numbers
do not consider the full range of job opportunities to which workers
apply, outside of any given occupational classification. By refusing
to acknowledge how labor markets are more broadly defined, these
stilted figures lead to an excessive estimate that “the average HHI is
3,157, which is . . . above the 2,500 threshold for high concentration
according to the Department of Justice / Federal Trade Commission
horizontal merger guidelines.”53 Notably, they find that going from
the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of HHI is associated with a
wage decline of up to 17 percent, 54 which is close to the Rinz
(over)estimate of 15 percent.
The “up to” is a bit of a fudge because it does not rule out lower
estimates. But even if we put that aside, I see no reason to think that
job-posting activity is an accurate proxy for any meaningful
economic data. It is not a direct measure of industry concentration,
nor serves as a robust proxy. It is not a measure of merger activity. It
is not a measure of the relevant labor market. It is not even a good
measure of labor turnover, because it fails to take into account
positions that are filled from within the firm or positions filled by
word-of-mouth or some other connection. Nor is it surprising that
advertised wages tend to increase as more firms are looking for given
types of workers. As we know from the recent spate of job activity,
that behavior works both in competitive and monopsonistic markets.
The large wage declines postulated by Rinz and Azar cannot in
my view be explained by assuming that employers act individually,
but must be understood by viewing the actions in parallel. At this
point, it then becomes critical to note that there is good reason to
think that the transactional obstacles to the formation of employer

53
54

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
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labor cartels are formidable to say the least. In dealing with various
price fixing arrangements in product markets, there is always some
effort to infer cooperation from publicly observed price movements.
The leading case that allows for this possibility to go forward is In re
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust
Litigation,55 in which Judge Dorothy Nelson overturned a summary
judgment for the defendants by allowing the four plaintiff states—
Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington—to reach the jury on
the question of whether the various price movements in the retail
market presaged that similar activities took place in the wholesale
market between the defendants and their service stations. The
argument rested on a signaling theory espoused by the plaintiff’s
expert, Professor Keith Leffler, who observed that in a number of key
markets retail prices in the market followed a “sawtooth” pattern
with both sharp decreases and even sharper increases over periods
of roughly one to several weeks.56
Ironically, these “sawtooth” pattern price cycles have in fact been
observed in various retail gasoline markets, most notably in
Australia’s major cities. But, the common view is that these cycles are
indicative of competitive gasoline markets, which in the theoretical
economic literature are commonly referred to as “Edgeworth
Cycles.”57 Nonetheless, they were used in this instance to establish
the exact opposite, a price-fixing conspiracy. Judge Nelson was
correct to observe that the key case of Matsushita Electric Industry v.
Zenith Radio Corp. 58 did not preclude the use of circumstantial
evidence to establish such a price-fixing violation and instead

906 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 442.
57 See Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly II: Price Competition,
Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles, 56 ECONOMETRICA 571 (1988). See generally
Michael D. Noel, Edgeworth Price Cycles, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECON.
(Feb. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/Y523-JRL4] (The abstract concludes: “While the
gasoline cycles continue to generate public concern with claims of collusion often
raised, the current evidence favours Edgeworth price cycles being the result of
stronger competition and the source of lower retail gasoline prices.”).
58 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
55
56
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tethered Matsushita’s successful motion for summary judgment to
the underlying weakness of the antitrust theories of predatory
pricing. 59 Predatory pricing theories generally fail because the
alleged predator who prices at below cost will find it impossible to
recoup those losses down the road if their opponents follow the
correct strategies of holding back inventory and production until the
predator chokes on the excessive demand that its below-cost pricing
generates. But, in Petroleum Products, that difficulty did not arise
because cartelization takes effect immediately and lasts so long as the
parties are able to coordinate their activities and keep out new
entrants. Hence, it became a question of fact for the jury to see
whether the interpretation that the plaintiffs put on the sawtooth
pricing could persuade the jury, even after the defendants offered
evidence that these patterns were illusory.
I think that the odds of plaintiff winning on the sawtooth theory
were small at the time, and remain small today. But for these
purposes, the key point is that the entire case rests upon the
availability of public pricing information of sufficient quality and
quantity to make out that prospect, even though it leaves open the
question of proper damage calculations—this clearly leaky theory
does not lend itself to determining damages. But, when collusion is
charged in other markets without these price signals, the road to
success is much steeper. That weakness has become evident in the
Biden administration’s effort to reinvigorate the antitrust laws. On
November 17, 2021, President Biden asked Lina Khan, the all-too
energetic chairwoman of the FTC, to investigate “big oil” for price
fixing, relying solely on a recent spurt in oil prices to establish price
fixing by insisting: “Usually, prices at the pump correspond to

59 For my own view, see Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions
to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J LAW & POL’Y 61 (2007).
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movements in the price of unfinished gasoline.”60 But, there is many
a slip between cup and lip.61 For starters, energy prices are generally
volatile, and for that reason are generally excluded from the “core”
inflation figures.62 In addition, the coordination effort has to take into
account the behavior of at least 10 major producers, of which the
three largest are state-owned companies (PetroChina, Sinopec, and
Saudi Aramco), generating total revenues of $781.5 billion, as against
$528.4 billion in revenues for the three largest private producers (BP,
Exxon Mobil, and Royal Dutch Shell).63 Furthermore, price fixing is
made ever more difficult by the many grades of oil and the variety of
local requirements for additives and the like that vary across
jurisdictions. All of these factors are compounded by the consistent
effort of the Biden administration to slow down domestic fracking,
while vainly pleading to OPEC+ nations to increase their output.64
Thus, Biden’s oil case lies, at best, in shambles and could not get to a
jury, even under the standards set out in Petroleum Products.
The situation is far worse here. Starting with the assumption that
the same standards of proof apply in labor and product markets, one
big fact stands out. There is no comprehensive published list of
wages (let alone fringe benefits, statutory entitlements, currency
conversion rates, etc.) for any of the countless trades and
occupational categories found in the oil and gas industry, which, as

60 Letter of November 17, 2021 from President Joseph R. Biden to Chairwoman Lina
Khan of the Federal Trade Commission (Nov. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8TQTQT2V].
61 For my more detailed treatment of the matter, see Richard A. Epstein, Witch Hunt
Targets the Oil Companies, DEFINING IDEAS, HOOVER INST. (Nov. 29, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/WL8G-N4VF].
62
Will
Kenton,
Core
Inflation,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Nov.
27,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/6BP6-WMKG] (“Core inflation is the change in the costs of goods
and services but does not include those from the food and energy sectors. This
measure of inflation excludes these items because their prices are much more
volatile.”)
63 Katharina Buchholz, The Biggest Oil and Gas Companies in the World, STATISTA
(May 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/TH3X-F67E].
64 Epstein, supra note 61 (citing Ariel Cohen, OPEC Says to Biden: If You Want More
Oil, Pump It Yourself, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2021) [https://perma.cc/2AX5-38Z7]).
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I noted in my original article, exist in different firms in different
proportions.65 In addition, there is no information on how large firms
make their wage divisions across countries, firms, and departments.
It cannot be all done at the center, so that coordination has to take
place within multiple centers of the firm, which makes
communication, even within businesses difficult. To compound the
difficulty, many firms keep secret much wage information for
employees—secret because the release of that information to other
competitors could provide them with hints on how they organize
production or on which types of workers to hire. But even if they did
not, it is utterly impossible to think that firms could coordinate wages
by some implicit signaling device remotely similar to that used in
Petroleum Products, when they do not even know the identity or
numerosity of these firms outside their product markets that
compete in the same or similar labor markets.
It just boggles the mind to think that there is only a difference in
degree between most labor markets and the situations found in both
the hospital and book-merger cases, where the target population
could be identified with particularity. And, efforts by Rinz and Azar
to posit gains up to 17 percent (whatever “up to” means) presuppose
that the wage suppression devices in these chaotic markets rival the
power that the strongest of individual unions could exert against any
firm. What is needed to support this outlandish theory is a close
examination of the pricing patterns in some relevant market to see if
any investigation could go beyond the abstract evidence that these
so-called empirical studies generate.
None of the litigation to date remotely attempts to take on that
broader evidentiary and conceptual challenge. In order to close that
litigation gap, Posner points to a justly famous passage of Adam
Smith who rejects as “ignorant of the world” anyone who thinks that
masters do not collude in order to keep down the wages of their

65

Cf. Epstein, Labor Antitrust, supra note 2, at 378-384.
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employees. 66 “To violate this combination is everywhere a most
unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his
neighbours and equals.” 67 Note that Smith speaks of a world far
removed from our own. He posits that the master, who may be
colluding to suppress wages, has to answer to his “neighbours and
equals” in a single line of work. It takes no exotic signaling theory to
see how these Smith-like cases are plausible, as are what was equally
apparent in explicit efforts by workers to organize against their
employers, largely free of legal intervention, when historically,
antitrust law never subjected labor unions to the same scrutiny as
cartels—a fact set in stone in 1914 in the United States when they
were officially exempted from antitrust scrutiny.68 But, what set of
informal social sanctions could possibly apply to a firm that is said
to be in league with hundreds of different collaborators in a thousand
remote geographical and occupational markets which he cannot find
on a map? The supposed social sanctions, thus, disappear from view
and we are left with a set of random data points that look less like

66 Posner, Reply, supra note 1, at 404-05 (quoting ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS
35 (4th ed. 1786)). For those who want to see the full passage, it reads:

We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters
[employers], though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever
imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of
the world as of the subject. Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of
tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour
above their actual rate. To violate this combination is everywhere a most
unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbours
and equals. We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination, because it is the
usual, and one may say, the natural state of things, which nobody ever hears
of. Masters, too, sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the
wages of labour even below this rate. These are always conducted with the
utmost silence and secrecy, till the moment of execution, and when the
workmen yield, as they sometimes do, without resistance, though severely
felt by them, they are never heard of by other people.
SMITH, supra, at 35.
SMITH, supra note 66, at 35.
68 See Epstein, Labor Antitrust, supra note 2, at 347-349.
67
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Posner’s supposed “mountains” of evidence and more like a set of
disjointed mole hills.
CONCLUSION
The major theme of my original article and this brief response is
to stress the dangers of treating Posner’s form of counterintuitive
speculation about monopsony power as the basis of sound policy. A
limited use of antitrust law in targeted cases is what works.
Thereafter, there is a huge risk that the progressive antitrust theorist
will dismiss their inability to prove their cases in court by either
direct or circumstantial evidence, and instead insist that direct
administrative action, under some concocted econometric theory,
should be used to close what Posner and his supporters call the
“litigation gap.” 69 There is, moreover, no particular reason why
anyone armed with such theory would stop with the attack on
mergers, if the supposed monopsony power (like the ether) is
invisible but ever present. Why not go through each labor category
and try to estimate the supposed monopsony gap, after which
government officials steeped in the progressive tradition could
undertake to reset prices for the Fortune 500 companies and beyond?
The current system may result in some modest underenforcement,
but the alternative has endless possibilities for the mischief that
comes from overenforcement even though the standard economic
propositions still hold. There is no global evidence, given the chronic
fluctuations and frequent shortages, to believe that labor markets are
rife with hidden pockets of monopsony power that function as
economic black holes. Instead, the current rules with respect to both
covenants not-to-compete and merger guidelines get it about right.
The progressive revolution in antitrust will turn out to be a failure
wherever and whenever it is raised. So, I urge Posner to return to the
Chicago-fold before the mischievous and excessive antitrust

69

Posner, Reply, supra note 1, at 391-92, 397-401.
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enforcement follies in labor markets cause greater harm to social
welfare.

